and Principle B ("A pronoun is free in its governing category") of Binding Theory. However, there are a number of environments where reflexives and pronouns can both occur, with the same meaning. An example is (2), which allows for the reflexive as well as the pronoun inside the locative PP to co-refer with the subject of the sentence:
The boy i has placed the box behind himself i / him j/i
The pronoun in (2) is ambiguous, and can co-refer with the sentence-internal antecedent (i.e., the subject of the sentence), or an unmentioned sentence-external antecedent available in the discourse. The reflexive in (2) must co-refer with the subject. Reinhart and Reuland (1993) explain several well-known exceptions to the complementary distribution of reflexives and pronouns, such as (2), by reformulating the binding principles as conditions on reflexivity and reflexive-marking, and restricting the application of Principle A to syntactic predicates and the application of Principle B to semantic predicates. An alternative explanation is the optimality theoretic explanation of Hendriks and Spenader (2005/6) , who propose that a hierarchy of constraints referring to binding domains of different sizes, such as locative PPs and clauses with a subject, interacts with a hierarchy of constraints pertaining to the referential content of referring expressions.
Both theoretical accounts are able to explain the general pattern of distribution and interpretation of pronouns and reflexives illustrated in (1), as well as exceptions to this pattern exemplified in (2). In sentence (1), the pronoun must be disambiguated to give rise to the adult non-coreferential interpretation. Disambiguation of the pronoun by means of resourcesensitive operations such as reference-set computation (Reinhart, 2006) or bidirectional optimization (Hendriks & Spenader, 2005/6 ) is argued to go beyond children's limited cognitive capacities, resulting in the Delay of Principle B Effect. Because the pronoun in (2) is ambiguous for adults, there is no need for disambiguation. Hence, neither account predicts any comprehension difficulty for children in this case.
Unfortunately, experimental investigations of children's knowledge of Principle B have mainly focused on sentences such as (1), and have rarely taken into consideration sentences like (2). Consequently, not much is known about children's interpretation of pronouns in locative PPs.
Using eye-tracking to assess children's knowledge
A notable exception to the general focus of acquisition research on Principle B environments is Sekerina et al. (2004) , who carried out an eye-tracking study to investigate adults' and children's knowledge and processing of sentences such as (2). The participants in their eyetracking experiment saw two pictures, and were then asked a question about the pictures. For example, one picture would show a boy and a man with a box behind the boy, and the other picture would show the same boy and the same man with the box behind the man. Participants would then hear the question "Which picture shows that the boy has placed the box behind him?". In this forced-choice picture selection task, the adult participants had to press a button as fast as they could to indicate their choice, while their reaction times were measured. The 4-to 7-year old child participants had to choose a picture by pointing to it with their finger, without any measurement of their reaction times. Therefore, instead of a question, they heard the instruction "Now point to the picture where the boy has placed the box behind him".
For adults, the obtained data from responses, reaction times and eye movements all three indicated that the pronoun was referentially ambiguous to them. Adults frequently chose the sentence-external referent, although they did have a strong preference for the sentenceinternal referent. For children, the off-line responses and on-line eye movements gave different results. Initially, the children mainly looked at the picture with the sentence-internal referent. Only after about 1000 milliseconds they started looking at the picture with the sentence-external referent. This suggests that, although the children take much longer than the adults to become aware of the ambiguity of the pronoun, they did notice this ambiguity.
However, children's awareness of the ambiguity did not affect their choice in the picture selection task. In the picture selection task, children overwhelmingly chose the sentenceinternal referent.
Children's knowledge of Principle B
The on-line and off-line performance of the adults in their study is interpreted by Sekerina et al. (2004) as providing support for a performance-based explanation, as opposed to a grammar-based explanation. According to a performance-based explanation, the interpretation of pronouns in sentences such as (2) is determined by discourse considerations. That is, these pronouns refer to the most salient, most recent, most prominent referent in the discourse, which is the subject of the sentence in Sekerina et al.'s study. However, the performance of the adults in their study is also compatible with the theoretical accounts of Reinhart and Reuland (1993) and Hendriks and Spenader (2005/6) . Recall that both theoretical accounts predict pronouns in the syntactic environment in (2) to be ambiguous. If the grammar allows for a sentence-internal as well as a sentence-external referent, discourse considerations may make one of the two interpretations the preferred interpretation. As picture selection tasks do not test whether a particular interpretation is possible or not, but rather which of a given set of interpretations is the preferred interpretation, we expect such discourse considerations to influence participants' choice. In fact, it is unclear how a performance-based explanation alone would be able to explain the observed pattern. Without a linguistic theory that accounts for why the pronoun in (2), but not the pronoun in (1), is syntactically ambiguous, pronouns are incorrectly predicted to be interpreted similarly in (1) and (2).
Regarding children's eye movement results, Sekerina et al. argue that the similarity between children's eye movement data and adults' eye movement data supports the hypothesis that children's processing mechanisms work just like adults'. Children use referential information in exactly the same way as adults, they just need more time to access discourse information during sentence processing. Again, the generative syntactic account of
Reinhart and Reuland and the optimality theoretic account of Hendriks and Spenader are able to explain these results too, albeit from the perspective of the grammar. The pronoun in (2) is syntactically ambiguous for children, just as it is for adults.
The theoretical accounts of Reinhart and Reuland (1993) and Hendriks and Spenader (2005/6 ) make a distinction between the syntactic environment in (1), a standard Principle B context, and the syntactic environment in (2). In the latter environment, the complementary distribution between reflexives and pronouns breaks down as a result of particular properties of the principles or constraints of the grammar. Consequently, children's adult-like pattern of eye movements with sentences such as (2) does not tell us anything about their ability to interpret pronouns correctly in Principle B contexts such as (1). Sekerina et al. (2004) , however, explicitly relate children's performance on sentences such as (2) to "the pattern of difficulty well-attested in the acquisition literature" (p. 148), ignoring the different treatments these sentences receive in the theoretical literature. By doing so, they suggest that, at least at the level of eye movements, the children in their study do not show any difficulty with Principle B. This syntactically unfounded suggestion may have led others to claim that studies using eye-tracking have shown that "children as young as 4 years of age demonstrate on-line sensitivity to syntactic binding constraints" (Love et al., 2009: 287) .
When evidence does not converge
Whereas This could account for the observation that in general a picture selection task seems to be 'easier' for children than a truth-value judgment task.
So the dissociation Sekerina et al. found between children's eye movements and their off-line responses may very well be a task-related effect, caused by problems that are specific to the picture selection task. Others, who assumed this dissociation to be real, have used this dissociation to support their own finding of a discrepancy between their eye-tracking results and other experimental tasks (e.g., Höhle et al., 2009) . Only if these dissociations are based on carefully designed experiments whose results are supported by additional evidence, it may be concluded that the eye-tracking methodology is more sensitive than other empirical methods.
However, because of the potential problems with Sekerina et al.'s picture selection task, there is no reason yet to treat eye gaze patterns as a special source of evidence for children's knowledge that overrides all other sources of evidence.
Conclusion
To explain the results of their eye-tracking study, Sekerina et al. (2004) suggest that children possess knowledge of Principle B, but are not yet able to apply their knowledge in a picture selection task. However, the validity of the first part of their suggested explanation was questioned in section 4, where it was pointed out that correct performance on the test sentences does not imply similar correct performance in Principle B contexts. The validity of the second part of the suggested explanation was questioned in section 5, where it was shown that there may have been independent problems with the picture selection task in their study.
So the results of Sekerina et al.'s study do not seem to lend support to the view that eyetracking is more sensitive to children's knowledge than commonly used off-line methods such
